



**Bank of Canada**  
**Technical Reports**

**Rapports techniques**  
**Banque du Canada**



March 1981

Technical Report 23

THE PRODUCTIVITY-INFLATION NEXUS IN CANADA  
1963-1979

by

J. Peter Jarrett and Jack G. Selody

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and no responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.

## CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	i
RÉSUMÉ	iii
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH	3
3. MECHANISMS THROUGH WHICH INFLATION CAN REDUCE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH	5
4. A REDUCED-FORM BIVARIATE MODEL	10
5. A STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION	19
6. FINAL REMARKS	36
FOOTNOTES	39
APPENDIX A	51
APPENDIX B	53
APPENDIX C	56
REFERENCES	61

**ABSTRACT**

During recent years the Canadian economy has been simultaneously subjected to increasing rates of inflation and declining growth in labour productivity. Virtually all analysis of the macroeconomic relationship between the two phenomena has been based on the premise that there is a unidirectional flow of causation from productivity growth (assumed to be exogenous) to inflation.

In this paper we have attempted to identify the macroeconomic relationship between labour productivity growth and inflation. Specifically, we utilized both a reduced-form, bivariate Granger technique and structural models to test the hypothesis that the result of increased productivity growth is a one-for-one reduction in inflation against the alternative hypothesis that, because of a feedback relationship, inflation may itself have had a negative effect on productivity growth in Canada over the 1963-79 period. In the bivariate case we observed the existence of bidirectional causality and this allowed us to reject the hypothesis that the payoff to increased productivity growth is a unit-proportional reduction in inflation. Rather, the implied multiplier is 2.24. A variety of structural models also displayed a feedback relationship. Anticipated inflation was shown to figure more importantly than unanticipated inflation in its negative effect on

productivity growth, but our measures of uncertainty about inflation appeared to have had no incremental influence. Depending on how one proxies inflation expectations in the model, a 'permanent' one percentage point increase in inflation leads to a reduction in productivity growth of .08 to .34 percentage points. This is sufficient to explain a substantial portion of the recent slowdown in productivity growth. The long-run inflation multiplier associated with an increase in productivity growth lies in the range of  $-.75$  to  $-1.33$ .

**RÉSUMÉ**

Au cours des dernières années, l'économie canadienne a fait face simultanément à une aggravation de plus en plus marquée de l'inflation et à un ralentissement de la croissance de la productivité du travail. Presque toutes les analyses des relations macroéconomiques entre ces deux phénomènes se sont fondées sur la prémisse qu'il existe un lien de causalité univoque entre l'accroissement de la productivité (qu'on considère comme exogène) et l'inflation.

Dans cette étude, nous avons tenté d'identifier la relation macroéconomique existant entre l'accroissement de la productivité et l'inflation. Nous avons utilisé à la fois la technique de Granger, modèle de forme réduite à deux variables, et les modèles structurels en vue de comparer les deux hypothèses suivantes : la première, qui veut qu'une accélération de la croissance de la productivité entraîne une réduction du taux d'inflation, et la seconde qui veut que par rétroaction l'inflation ait eu au Canada, entre 1963 et 1979, un effet négatif sur l'accroissement de la productivité. Dans le modèle à deux variables, nous avons observé que la relation de cause à effet était biunivoque. Cela nous a amenés à rejeter l'hypothèse selon laquelle une accélération de la croissance de la productivité aurait eu pour conséquence une réduction équivalente du taux d'inflation. Le multiplicateur

implicite a plutôt été de 2,24. Un grand nombre de modèles structurels ont révélé l'existence de l'effet de rétroaction. Nous avons montré que l'effet négatif que produit l'inflation anticipée sur la croissance de la productivité est plus important que celui qui est causé par l'inflation non anticipée, mais les incertitudes au sujet de l'inflation semblent n'avoir eu en soi aucune incidence sur l'accroissement de la productivité. Selon la manière dont les anticipations inflationnistes sont représentées dans le modèle, une augmentation constante de 1 point de pourcentage du taux d'inflation provoque un ralentissement de l'accroissement de la productivité de l'ordre de 0,08 à 0,34 point de pourcentage. Cette constatation suffit à expliquer en très grande partie le récent ralentissement de la croissance de la productivité. Le multiplicateur à long terme du taux d'inflation lié à un accroissement de la productivité se situe entre -0,75 et -1,33.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank D. Kelly for his extensive assistance on an earlier draft; our colleagues J.P. Aubry, L. Kenward, K.G. Lynch, P. Masson, D. Rose, C. Simard, G. Stuber and W. White also provided valuable comments. We would also like to thank D. Fleet and P. Cloutier for their programming assistance and Lea-Anne Solomonian for editorial advice.



## 1 INTRODUCTION

The macroeconomic relationship between labour productivity (output per man-hour) and inflation is important to the understanding of the stagflationary malaise that has gripped the U.S. and Canadian economies during the past decade. Virtually all analysis of this relationship has been based on the premise that there is a simple, unidirectional line of causation running from productivity growth (assumed to be exogenous) to inflation. This belief is exemplified by the rule-of-thumb or neoclassical condition that equates price inflation with the difference between wage inflation and productivity growth.

Recently, numerous arguments have been put forward as to why increases in price inflation can conversely have a negative effect on productivity growth. Most of these arguments are based on the concept that inflation induces an increasingly severe tax burden on the private sector because of a non-neutral tax structure. In addition, an observed correlation of inflation with the variance of inflation and with the dispersion of relative prices leads to arguments that inflation reduces investment and causes economic inefficiencies by increasing the probability of entrepreneurial error.

In this paper we examine the time-series relationship between productivity growth and inflation. To do this we test the hypothesis that an increase in productivity growth leads to a unit-proportional reduction in inflation, or whether the response might be more than one-for-one because of a feedback relation-

ship. We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief review of previous research relating inflation and productivity growth. In Section 3 the mechanisms by which inflation can reduce productivity growth are outlined. The dynamics of the inflation-productivity growth relationship are explored in Section 4 using reduced forms, and in Section 5 we examine simple structural models in order to increase the power of the tests. In Section 6 some conclusions are offered.

## 2 PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

A negative correlation between productivity growth and industry price inflation has been demonstrated by Lydall (1968) for 54 Australian manufacturing industries; by Kendrick (1973) for 21 U.S. manufacturing industries over the period 1948 to 1969; by Klein (1980) for about 500 U.S. industries over the period 1965 to 1972; and by Kendrick and Grossman (1980) for 30 U.S. industries over the period 1948 to 1976. Moreover, Kendrick and Grossman found the absolute value of the correlation coefficient to be higher during the latter third of their sample (pp. 67, 74, 80). At the macroeconomic level, regression analysis using aggregate price measures has also indicated a negative correlation between productivity growth and inflation (Productivity Perspective, American Productivity Center Inc., cited in Zell, 1979).

More recently, Freund and Manchester (1980) hypothesized a model of wage determination (similar to ones espoused by Malkiel, 1979, p. 293 and Lewis, 1980, p. 559) which allows a direct test of the unit elasticity presumption, given the implicit assumption of unidirectional causation from productivity growth to inflation. In this model a closed economy, or one with fixed terms of trade, with productivity growth of  $x$  percent per year is in dynamic equilibrium when workers, cognizant of this growth, bargain for similar real wage increases. Subsequently, if productivity growth declines to  $x-n$  percent per annum, but workers are slow to recognize this fact and continue to demand the same real wage increases, inflation must accelerate to reduce the ex post real

wage increase to  $x-n$  percent. Until workers recognize and accept a new, lower rate of real wage increase, inflation will spiral up, reaching a higher long-run rate where dynamic equilibrium is eventually re-established. The Freund and Manchester model yields a reduced-form equation of wage inflation in the private business sector which, when estimated, shows productivity growth to have no significant effect on wage inflation, and the equilibrium long-run elasticity of price inflation with respect to productivity growth in the United States to be 4.4.<sup>1</sup> Freund and Manchester also cite the testimony of Michael Evans before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress in which Evans states that a multiplier of about two is likely (Evans, 1979).

While there has been some effort devoted to an examination of the response of inflation to productivity growth, empirical work on the impact of inflation on productivity growth is virtually nonexistent. In what follows we attempt to remedy this deficiency. Specifically, we test for the existence of a multiplier relationship by allowing inflation to feed back onto productivity growth.



### 3      **MECHANISMS THROUGH WHICH INFLATION CAN REDUCE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH**

There are a number of ways in which an increased rate of inflation may adversely affect productivity growth. First, inflation may affect the desire or ability of labour to do productive work. It may result in disincentives to labour directly or it may result in a need on the part of business managers to allocate a greater proportion of their labour force to 'unproductive' lines of work. For example, in an inflationary climate business managers are forced to allocate a greater portion of their workforce to such 'unproductive' work as readjusting prices, monitoring factor and rival product price increases, recontracting, hiring forecasting services, and conducting market surveys to determine how resistant consumers are to nominal price increases. Leijonhufvud (1977) has pointed out that in times of inflation the payoff for devoting effort to 'real' activities declines relative to that for playing the inflation game correctly, thereby reducing the relative reward and hence the effort devoted to socially productive hard work. In addition, reliance on private economic contracting will decline and more effort will be devoted to forming political coalitions in order to avoid the distributional consequences of inflation. Both of these factors suggest labour productivity will suffer during an inflationary period.

Second, inflation may also affect labour productivity by causing an inefficient mix of factor inputs. Inefficient factor

combinations, and hence lower productivity, can result if relative factor prices change faster than factor inputs can be adjusted. If factors are mixed in inefficient proportions, inflation can lower the intensity with which a particular factor, be it capital or labour, is used. Inflation can also result in inefficiencies in factor mixes by lowering the information content of price signals, thus decreasing the reliability of absolute price movements to reflect relative price changes accurately. Even in a period of steady inflation the information content of price changes is reduced. Hence, even if firms correctly anticipate that inflation will average  $x$  percent over the relevant time horizon, it does not necessarily follow that they will also correctly anticipate the rates of change of any particular price. With less information on which to base their decisions, business managers will make more errors and hence will more often choose sub-optimal factor input mixes and sub-optimal types of capital (particularly a relative abundance of short-lived capital). Moreover, there is an increase in the optimal expenditure of time and resources on search activities and on what Jaffee and Kleiman (1977) have termed 'protective outlays', that is, efforts to get out of nominal and into real assets. In addition, inflation shortens optimal contract length and planning horizons thereby increasing contracting costs. Both Weil (1979) and Hayes and Abernathy (1980) have hypothesized that a shorter management planning horizon has affected labour productivity growth adversely.

Increasing uncertainty about inflation can decrease

productivity by inducing firms to increase their inventories of 'unproductive' buffer stocks and to reduce their expenditures on long-term basic research (Mansfield, 1980, p. 871). Klein (1976) has argued that a higher rate of inflation tends to be associated with a higher variance of inflation, a greater dispersion of inflation expectations (Jaffee and Kleiman, 1977) and increasing uncertainty about the longer run mean rate of inflation.<sup>2</sup> Vining and Elwertowski (1976) have found that the increasing variance of the price level is not independent of the increasing dispersion of relative prices,<sup>3</sup> while Parks (1978) has argued that relative price variability is especially sensitive to the unanticipated component of inflation. Amihud (1981) found that from 1964 to 1975 inflation stimulated U.S. man-hours employed (controlling for inflation uncertainty), but did not affect real output, clearly pointing to reduced labour productivity. Most recently, Blejer and Leiderman (1980) have shown that each of real output, unemployment and employment (see also Levi and Makin, 1980) are adversely affected by relative price variability. Most importantly, they found the negative coefficient in the real output equation to be about twice the magnitude of its counterpart in the employment equation. Klein also claimed that it is not price variability per se that has led to increasing uncertainty, but a lack of understanding of the process that generates movements in the price level. He suggested that during the 1960s and early 1970s there was a generally poor understanding of the source of the prevailing inflation.

Gordon and Halpern (1976) have pointed out that one of the consequences of the increased uncertainty about inflation is a reduction in the real spread between monetary and non-monetary assets. Thus, fixed investment is likely to suffer at the expense of liquidity as required rates of return rise, optimal net investment falls and replacement investment is deferred (Nelson, 1976b).<sup>4</sup>

Finally, because of non-neutral tax laws, inflation reduces after-tax profits<sup>5</sup> and this in turn causes a decline in capital accumulation. Inflation interacts with the tax system in a number of ways to alter the expected after-tax real rate of return on fixed investment. On the one hand, debt-financed investment is more attractive in an inflationary environment because nominal interest payments are tax deductible. On the other hand, fixed-asset investments are less attractive because allowable depreciation is based on historical costs. Cross (1980) claims that for fixed assets with lifetimes exceeding one year, the net effect of inflation on required marginal rates of return is positive. His results are suspect, however, since he overlooked the fact that nominal capital gains and inventory profits are taxed, and hence that inflation increases the effective rate of taxation and further reduces after-tax rates of return.

There is now ample evidence of both a theoretical and an empirical nature that inflation has reduced after-tax profits in Canada as well as elsewhere.<sup>6</sup> This is probably the result of tax laws as well as the historical inability of many entrepreneurs



to see through the veil of inflation and protect themselves to the maximum degree possible. In Britain, the Sandilands Committee (1975) reported that about one-third of even the larger British firms did not use any form of inflation accounting systems. Kopcke (1978) reported that in the United States at the end of 1976, only one-quarter of total inventories were covered by the last-in first-out (LIFO) inventory accounting method, despite its acknowledged advantage to firms in times of inflation. It is therefore not surprising that real equity prices and returns do not seem to be invariant to inflation.<sup>7</sup>

A good statement of this mechanism has recently been provided by the U.S. Joint Economic Committee: "Thus under presently required accounting practices, a rise in the inflation rate raises real corporate tax liability, lowers real after-tax profits, and therefore reduces the real after-tax rate of return on fixed investment. This means that there is a direct adverse link between the rate of inflation and the level of capital spending, and this traps the economy in a vicious circle. Low investment and sluggish productivity help to raise the inflation rate and the higher inflation rate helps to keep investment and productivity depressed." (U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 1978, p. 141.)<sup>8</sup>

#### 4 A REDUCED-FORM BIVARIATE MODEL

In this section we explore the dynamic relationship between productivity growth and inflation using a technique pioneered by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972). This technique is generally referred to as testing for exogeneity or for Granger-causality. In practice, a variable X is said to 'Granger-cause' Y if the past history of X is of significant value in reducing the variance of a least-squares autoregressive prediction of Y. Sims (1977) has demonstrated that if X is exogenous to Y in the usual econometric sense, then Y does not Granger-cause X.

While the Granger-Sims technique is a useful device for exploring the dynamic relationship between two variables, it is not very powerful either as a test of causality or of exogeneity. Because the Granger-Sims technique relies on correlation analysis, it lacks power as a test of causation since correlation does not necessarily imply causation.<sup>9</sup> In particular, Granger-causality does not coincide with what Zellner (1979) regards as a more acceptable concept, namely, "predictability according to a law or set of laws", unless it has associated with it an explicit structural model (i.e., a set of laws). Nevertheless, intertemporal correlation patterns are important and useful in the identification of relationships that are causal according to Zellner's definition.

Consider the following structural model:

$$p_t = C_{11}(L) q_t + C_{12}(L) z_t$$

$$q_t = C_{21}(L) p_t + C_{22}(L) v_t \quad (1)$$

where

$p_t$  represents the rate of inflation,

$q_t$  represents the growth in labour productivity,

$z_t$  represents other possible influences on inflation  
such as monetary or wage growth or demand pressure,

$v_t$  represents other possible influences on labour  
productivity growth, for example cyclical economic  
activity or the growth of capital intensity, and

$L$  represents the lag operator such that

$$L^m x_t = x_{t-m}$$

and

$$C_{ij}(L) = c_{0ij} + c_{1ij}L + \dots + c_{nij}L^n$$

We assume equations (1) are structural in the sense that the  $C_{ij}$  terms are policy invariant.

The Granger-Sims technique operates on a bivariate reduced form which can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} p_t &= B_{11}(L) p_t + B_{12}(L) q_t + u_{1t} \\ q_t &= B_{21}(L) p_t + B_{22}(L) q_t + u_{2t} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where  $u_1$  and  $u_2$  are independent (i.e.,  $u_{1t}$  and  $u_{2s}$  are not correlated for all  $t$  and  $s$ , Sims, 1977) and the  $B_{ij}(L)$  polynomials are now defined exclusive of the contemporaneous term  $b_{0ij}$ . Equations (2) can be derived from equations (1) providing  $z_t$  and  $v_t$  are strictly exogenous (i.e., the equations for  $p_t$  and  $q_t$  can be characterized as a recursive 'block' in a more elaborate model), and providing that  $z_t$  and  $v_t$  can be represented as invertible moving average processes.

Equations (2) can be used to identify the dynamic relationship between inflation and productivity growth in the following manner. If  $B_{12}(L) = B_{21}(L) = 0$ , then inflation and productivity growth are said to be temporally independent. Of course, this result does not indicate that  $p$  and  $q$  are also contemporaneously independent since it does not imply that  $c_{011} = c_{021} = 0$  in equations (1).

If, on the other hand, neither  $B_{12}(L)$  nor  $B_{21}(L)$  are zero, this indicates that there is a dynamic relationship between inflation and productivity growth that includes feedback. In this case we have identified a relationship in which inflation



Granger-causes productivity growth which in turn feeds back onto inflation. Again, nothing concrete can be inferred about the contemporaneous nature of the relationship. Finally, if  $B_{12}(L) = 0$  but  $B_{21}(L) \neq 0$ , there is a one-way dynamic relationship from inflation to productivity growth; conversely, if  $B_{21}(L) = 0$  but  $B_{12}(L) \neq 0$ , there is a one-way dynamic relationship from productivity growth to inflation.

The assumption that  $u_1$  and  $u_2$  are independent is critical to the interpretation of the test results. Specifically, if  $u_1$  and  $u_2$  are not independent, then a control relationship between productivity growth and inflation may not exist even if  $B_{12}(L)$  and  $B_{21}(L)$  differ from zero. The reason is that the influence of any excluded variables may not be adequately captured by a distributed lag on past values of the left-hand variable. As a consequence, the observed relationship between inflation and productivity growth may not be causal in the sense that if inflation could be controlled then productivity growth could also be controlled. In the empirical work that follows we examine the assumption of independence by constructing a cross-correlogram between  $u_1$  and  $u_2$ .

We explored the relationship between inflation and productivity growth for the period 1963 Q2 to 1979 Q4. Productivity growth ( $q$ ) was measured as the quarterly percent change in the ratio of seasonally adjusted Real Domestic Product (RDP) (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 61-213) to estimated total man-hours worked (the product of total employment and average

weekly hours worked). Employment data were obtained from the Labour Force Survey (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 71-001). Data on the hours of employment per worker were obtained from the Large Establishment Survey (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 72-002). Construction, mining and manufacturing were presumed to be representative in terms of average weekly hours worked.<sup>10</sup> Inflation (p) was measured as the quarterly percent change in the ratio of seasonally adjusted<sup>11</sup> Gross Domestic Product to Real Domestic Product. Both the productivity growth and inflation series appeared to be covariance stationary -- a necessary condition for the application of Granger-Sims techniques -- as neither the mean nor the variance of either series showed any indication of having a secular trend.

In choosing the lengths of the lags in equations (2) we followed the method suggested by Hsiao (1979). This procedure involved first regressing each variable on its own lagged values and choosing the lag length that minimized Akaike's (1969) Final Prediction Error (FPE).<sup>12</sup> The minimum FPE occurred with eight lags for inflation and one lag for productivity growth. The second step involved including lagged values of inflation in the productivity growth equation and vice versa, and again minimizing the FPE. The number of lags on productivity growth in the inflation equation was found to be six, while the number of lags on inflation in the productivity growth equation was two. Finally, lagged values of the dependent variable in each growth equation were again allowed to vary in order to confirm the choice of lag

length. No change in the order of lags was deemed necessary.

Once the orders of the lag lengths were determined, equations (2) were estimated using Wymer's (1968) Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) program. FIML estimation provides efficient parameter estimates. The results are as follows (asymptotic t-ratios are given in parentheses):

$$\begin{aligned}
 p = & .68 + .20p(-1) + .38p(-2) + .35p(-3) + .29p(-4) - .16p(-5) \\
 & (2.2) \quad (1.8) \quad (3.4) \quad (2.7) \quad (2.3) \quad (1.3) \\
 & - .07p(-6) + .10p(-7) - .36p(-8) + .07q(-1) + .07q(-2) \\
 & (0.6) \quad (0.8) \quad (3.1) \quad (0.6) \quad (0.6) \\
 & + .13q(-3) - .35q(-4) + .05q(-5) - .36q(-6) \\
 & (1.1) \quad (2.9) \quad (0.4) \quad (2.8)
 \end{aligned}$$

sum of coefficients on inflation = .75 (6.4)

sum of coefficients on productivity growth = -.39 (1.2)

Quasi-R<sup>2</sup> = .64

$$\begin{aligned}
 q = & .91 - .07p(-1) - .17p(-2) - .06q(-1) \\
 & (5.3) \quad (0.7) \quad (1.8) \quad (0.5)
 \end{aligned}$$

sum of coefficients on inflation = -.24 (2.5)

sum of coefficients on productivity growth = -.06 (0.5)

Quasi-R<sup>2</sup> = .09 (MODEL 1)

NOTE: Quasi-R<sup>2</sup> is calculated as one minus the ratio of the variance of the structural residual to the variance of the left-hand variable. Thus, its value lies in the interval [-∞, 1].

These estimates indicate a two-way multiplier relationship between inflation and productivity growth. When a two-way relationship is taken as the maintained hypothesis and tested against alternative one-way relationships, each alternative can be rejected in favour of the two-way relationship.<sup>13</sup> The results of these likelihood ratio tests are reported in Table 1.

**TABLE 1**  
**TESTS OF MAINTAINED HYPOTHESIS**

<u>Alternative hypotheses</u>	<u>Value of likelihood ratio</u>	<u><math>\chi^2</math> Critical value (.05)</u>	<u>Result</u>
$q \rightarrow p; p \not\rightarrow q$	6.3	6.0	Reject
$q \not\rightarrow p; p \rightarrow q$	15.5	12.6	Reject

The economic implications of these results are clear. In the long run, a one percentage point 'permanent' positive shock to productivity growth results in a 1.46 percentage point increase in productivity growth and a 2.24 percentage point drop in inflation. A permanent one percentage point positive shock to inflation translates into an eventual 6.05 percentage point increase in inflation and a 1.38 percentage point reduction in productivity growth. Adjustment is virtually complete after 17 years with most



of the response occurring during the first 3 years.

A permanent one percentage point increase in inflation is associated with a greater than one percentage point drop in productivity growth and a permanent one percentage point increase in productivity growth is associated with a greater than one percentage point decrease in inflation. It is noteworthy that while large in size, our estimate of the response of inflation to a change in productivity growth is much smaller than that calculated by Freund and Manchester (1980) on the basis of a unidirectional relationship from productivity growth to inflation.

As mentioned above, there remains the possibility that the estimated relationship between inflation and productivity growth is not causal in a control sense but is instead the sole product of a neglected third causal factor. To explore for this possibility we examined the cross-correlogram of the residuals from the estimated equations. The results were mixed: Haugh's (1976) test of the independence of two time series yielded a chi-square value that was not significant at the 5 percent level - an indication that the hypothesis of intertemporal independence cannot be rejected. However, there were significant individual correlations at lags of 11 quarters and 13 quarters (as measured against the two standard deviation benchmark of  $2/\sqrt{n}$ ). Thus, there is some indication that a bivariate reduced form does not adequately characterize the relationship between inflation and productivity growth and that a

further refinement of the relationship would therefore be useful. The 'marginal' character of some of the likelihood ratio test results suggests that conducting tests to explore the robustness of these results would be desirable.

## 5 A STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION

In order to refine our model further, we decided to expand the set of probable determinants of inflation and productivity growth. A popular representation of the inflation process is the wage-markup-adjusted-for-market-conditions model. In this model, price inflation ( $p$ ) is determined by its relationship with wage inflation ( $w$ ), productivity growth ( $q$ ), excess demand in the domestic market ( $dev$ ), and U.S. inflation ( $pus$ ). U.S. inflation is included because the Canadian economy is a small, 'open' economy.

Wage inflation is measured as the rate of change in the seasonally adjusted average weekly wage of the industrial composite plus the community services, government and agriculture sectors, and includes loss due to strikes (Statistics Canada Catalogue nos. 72-005 and 72-008). Fluctuations in domestic excess demand are proxied by deviations in Real Domestic Product (RDP) about its trend.<sup>14</sup> The rate of U.S. inflation is measured by the U.S. implicit GNP deflator (Survey of Current Business 7,1).

Numerous factors have been put forward as possible determinants of productivity growth. Of these, the growth in capital intensity ( $kl$ ) seems to be the most popular. Capital intensity is measured as the ratio of fixed capital to labour, where fixed capital includes the stock of machinery and equipment and non-residential construction. Fixed capital is obviously the principal substitute for labour in production as well as the primary vehicle for embodied technical progress.

It is also well known that cyclical variations are reflected in productivity growth, probably because there are longer delays in factor input adjustment than are required for output adjustment. Consequently, the deviation of RDP about trend is included as an additional determinant of productivity growth. And finally, our hypothesis about inflation feedback dictates that inflation also be included in the productivity growth equation.

FIML estimation of these relationships yielded the following results:

$$\begin{aligned}
 p = & - .24 & - .17q & - .27q(-1) & - .00q(-2) & - .06q(-3) & - .10q(-4) \\
 & (0.8) & (1.5) & (2.6) & (0.0) & (0.6) & (1.0) \\
 & + .38w & - .03w(-1) & + .24w(-2) & - .36w(-3) & + .13w(-4) \\
 & (2.6) & (0.2) & (1.5) & (2.4) & (0.9) \\
 & + .37dev & - .54dev(-1) & + .61dev(-2) & - .45dev(-3) & + 1.05pus \\
 & (2.8) & (2.9) & (3.3) & (3.8) & (7.0)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Quasi-R}^2 = .75$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 q = & .36 & - .01p & + .01p(-1) & - .11p(-2) & - .14p(-3) & - .03p(-4) \\
 & (6.9) & (0.3) & (0.4) & (3.0) & (3.6) & (0.7) \\
 & + .02p(-5) & - .06p(-6) & + .97k1 & + .82dev & - .92dev(-1) \\
 & (0.5) & (1.6) & (24.3) & (18.1) & (20.0)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Quasi-R}^2 = .92$$

(MODEL 2)

The sum of the current and lag coefficients together with their appropriate asymptotic t-ratios are as follows:

response of p to q	-.60 (2.4)	response of q to p	-.31 (9.5)
response of p to w	.37 (2.8)	response of q to k1	.96 (24.3)
response of p to dev	-.01 (0.2)	response of q to dev	-.10 (4.5)
response of p to pus	1.05 (7.0)		

The results clearly indicate a relationship running from productivity growth to inflation and back to productivity growth, confirming our earlier findings. The direct response of inflation to a one percentage point improvement in productivity growth is a decline of .60 percentage points, which is within two standard deviations of a unit decline. The long-run multiplier (including feedback) is  $-.75$ . If we examine the other side of the coin, we find that the direct response of productivity growth to a one percentage point increase in inflation is  $-.31$  percentage points which, because of feedback, eventually translates (within approximately 6 years) into a 1.23 percentage point increase in inflation and a .38 percentage point decline in the growth rate of productivity.<sup>15</sup> The long-run pre-1973 rate of productivity growth was 2.9 percent per annum and the 1976-79 rate was only .7 percent per annum; thus, the recent slowdown amounts to about 2.2 percentage points. The annual rate of inflation has likewise increased from about 3 percent to at least 9 to 10 percent. According to Model 2 an increase in inflation of this magnitude

would result in a decline in productivity growth of about 2 percentage points. In other words, the increase in inflation through the past decade is sufficient to explain virtually the entire measured slowdown in labour productivity growth!

Inflation in Canada responds positively to domestic wage inflation, to U.S. inflation and to contemporaneous excess demand. However, a shock to excess demand does not produce a sustained inflationary response but does induce volatility in the rate of inflation: the coefficients on dev in the inflation equation are large, significant, and of alternating signs, while the sum of the coefficients is small and insignificant. Productivity growth responds positively to increasing capital intensity and positively, on impact, to variations in demand. Over the longer term, a demand shock results in a statistically significant, albeit small, negative response from productivity growth.

Alternative versions of Model 2 were tested using likelihood ratio tests. The results, which are reported in Table 2, were mixed. The hypothesis that inflation does not cause a decline in productivity growth can be decisively rejected. However, the hypothesis that productivity growth has no effect on inflation cannot be rejected, even though the sum of the coefficients on productivity growth in the inflation equation is not significantly different from minus one. The reason for this unusual result appears to be multicollinearity between the lagged values of productivity growth and those of the excess demand variable. Hence, the coefficients on lagged productivity growth in the inflation equation are ill determined, and there is not enough



variance in the data to distinguish among models in which productivity growth is a significant determinant of inflation, models in which excess demand fluctuations are a significant determinant of inflation, and models which incorporate both of these relationships.

**TABLE 2**  
**TESTS OF ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS OF MODEL 2**

---

<u>Alternative hypotheses</u>	<u>Value of likelihood ratio</u>	<u><math>\chi^2</math> Critical value (.05)</u>	<u>Result</u>
$q \rightarrow p; p \not\rightarrow q$	59.96	14.1	Reject
$q \not\rightarrow p; p \rightarrow q$	9.52	11.1	Cannot reject

---

Examination of the cross-correlogram of the residuals from Model 2 revealed no significant correlations. Haugh's S-statistic was calculated to be 11.2, compared to a .05 critical value of 27.6. Thus, independence cannot be rejected and there is no indication that excluded influences are distorting our interpretation of the test results.

We now turn our investigation towards an identification of the characteristics of inflation that lead to the negative response in productivity growth. Three separate aspects of inflation were tested: anticipated inflation, unanticipated inflation and uncertainty about inflation. We posit that anticipations of inflation ( $p_e$ ) are adequately characterized by one-step-ahead

forecasts based on an eight-quarter autoregressive representation of the realized inflation process.<sup>16</sup> Further, since we based the autoregressive representation on seven years of previous experience, the parameters of the autoregressive model vary through time. This procedure of proxying anticipations is similar to that used by Kennedy and Lynch (1979). Unanticipated inflation (pu) is then defined residually as the difference between realized and anticipated inflation. Because anticipations of inflation are formed recursively, they can be treated as exogenous for purposes of estimation. The results of allowing anticipated and unanticipated inflation to influence productivity separately are presented below:

$$\begin{aligned}
 p = & - .23 & - .17q & - .26q(-1) & - .01q(-2) & - .06q(-3) & - .12q(-4) \\
 & (0.8) & (1.4) & (2.5) & (0.1) & (0.6) & (1.2) \\
 & + .38w & - .03w(-1) & + .24w(-2) & - .35w(-3) & + .14w(-4) \\
 & (2.6) & (0.2) & (1.5) & (2.3) & (1.0) \\
 & + .37dev & - .55dev(-1) & + .64dev(-2) & - .46dev(-3) & + 1.03 pus \\
 & (2.8) & (2.9) & (3.5) & (3.9) & (6.7)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Quasi-R}^2 = .75$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 q = & .27 & - .12pe & - .13pe(-1) & - .05pu & + .97k1 \\
 & (5.3) & (3.1) & (3.8) & (1.3) & (23.7) \\
 & + .86 dev & - .94 dev(-1) \\
 & (19.0) & (20.4)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Quasi-R}^2 = .92$$

(MODEL 3)

$$pu = p-pe$$

The sums of the coefficients are as follows:

response of p to q	-.63 (2.5)	response of q to pe	-.24 (8.3)
response of p to w	.39 (2.9)	response of q to pu	-.05 (1.3)
response of p to dev	-.01 (0.1)	response of q to dev	-.08 (3.5)
response of p to pus	1.03 (6.7)	response of q to kl	.97 (23.7)

These results are virtually identical to those from Model 2. They suggest that of any inflation-induced decline in productivity growth, 83 percent can be attributed to inflation that is anticipated, while the remaining 17 percent can be attributed to unanticipated inflation. The greater adverse impact of anticipated inflation is in accordance with the results of Blejer and Leiderman (1980) which show that unanticipated inflation stimulates both real output and employment, while anticipated inflation inhibits real output while still stimulating employment. The long-run response of productivity growth to a one percent increase in inflation that is perfectly foreseen is a decline of .29 percentage points, whereas an unforeseen increase results in a decline in productivity growth of .06 percentage points. The long-run anticipated (unanticipated) inflation multiplier associated with an increase in productivity growth is  $-.74$  ( $-.65$ ).

We simulated a perfectly foreseen increase in inflation by adding 1.0 to the constant term of the inflation equation and assuming that  $p_e = p$ . An unforeseen increase in inflation was simulated by adding 1.0 to the constant term of the inflation equation, leaving  $p_u = p - p_e$ , and by assuming that  $p_e$  remained unchanged in spite of the increase in realized inflation. A more 'realistic' simulation in which the increase in inflation is initially unforeseen but is eventually incorporated into expectations would produce results that lie between those of the two extremes cited above.<sup>17</sup>

Table 3 gives the 'causality' results:

**TABLE 3**  
**TESTS OF ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS OF MODEL 3**

Alternative hypotheses	Value of likelihood ratio	$\chi^2$ Critical value (.05)	Result
$q \rightarrow p; p_e \not\rightarrow q$	36.4	6.0	Reject
$q \rightarrow p; p_u \not\rightarrow q$	1.2	3.8	Cannot reject
$q \not\rightarrow p; p_e, p_u \rightarrow q$	9.5	11.1	Cannot reject

Feedback is again observed from (anticipated) inflation to productivity growth, and again the coefficients on productivity

growth in the inflation equation are ill determined, their sum being neither significantly different from zero nor from negative one. A likelihood ratio test of the restriction that the sum of the coefficients on productivity growth in the inflation equation equal negative one results in an  $\chi^2$  value of 1.8, as compared to the .05 critical value of 3.8. The sums of the remaining coefficient groups with this constraint imposed are:

response of p to q (constrained)	-1.0	response of q to pe	-.25 (8.7)
response of p to w	.42 (3.2)	response of q to pu	-.07 (1.7)
response of p to dev	.02 (0.4)	response of q to dev	-.08 (3.4)
response of p to pus	.92 (6.3)	response of q to kl	.96 (23.6)

The long-run productivity multiplier associated with a perfectly foreseen (unforeseen) increase in inflation is  $-.33$  ( $-.08$ ). The long-run inflation multiplier associated with an increase in productivity growth is  $-1.33$  if changes in inflation are perfectly foreseen and  $-1.08$  if they are not. Adjustment is virtually complete within two to three years.

It has been hypothesized that in addition to inflation per se, uncertainty about inflation also asserts a negative influence on productivity growth. To investigate this possibility we constructed two alternative measures of inflation uncertainty: (i) the square of the ratio of unexpected to expected inflation, and (ii) the square of the difference between actual inflation and an eight-quarter moving average of actual inflation. Likelihood ratio tests indicated that neither of these measures contributed significantly to the explanation of productivity growth.

A popular alternative to the above representation of the price determination process suggests that, in addition to productivity growth, the rate of growth of the money supply is a dominant driving force behind inflation.<sup>18</sup> When monetary growth is included in an equation describing inflation, it is usual to expect the sum of its coefficients to equal unity, based on a hypothesis of long-run neutrality. However, if inflation induces a permanent decline in productivity growth, a sum of unity implies money is not neutral in the long run. In this case a one percentage point decline in monetary growth would eventually reduce inflation by more than one percentage point. Moreover, if the velocity of the circulation of money is unaffected, real output must adjust.



The results of estimating this alternative model of the inflation-productivity growth relationship -- with monetary growth (m) measured by the seasonally adjusted rate of growth of M1 (Bank of Canada Review Table 14, Cansim series B1609) -- are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 p = & \begin{array}{cccccc}
 .12 & - .24q & - .15q(-1) & - .14q(-2) & + .04q(-3) & - .36q(-4) \\
 (0.3) & (1.8) & (1.1) & (1.1) & (0.3) & (2.6)
 \end{array} \\
 & + \begin{array}{ccccc}
 .00m & + .17m(-1) & + .05m(-2) & + .23m(-3) & + .02m(-4) \\
 (0.1) & (2.2) & (0.7) & (3.2) & (0.2)
 \end{array} \\
 & + \begin{array}{cccc}
 .02m(-5) & + .18m(-6) & + .01m(-7) & + .26m(-8) \\
 (0.3) & (2.6) & (0.1) & (3.4)
 \end{array}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Quasi-R}^2 = .53$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 q = & \begin{array}{ccccc}
 .30 & - .14pe & - .12pe(-1) & - .07pu & + .96kl \\
 (5.0) & (3.2) & (3.7) & (1.6) & (23.4)
 \end{array} \\
 & + \begin{array}{cc}
 .85dev & - .93dev(-1) \\
 (19.0) & (20.4)
 \end{array}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Quasi-R}^2 = .91$$

$$pu = p-pe$$

(MODEL 4)

The coefficient sums are as follows:

response of p to q	-.86 (2.9)	response of q to pe	-.26 (7.6)
response of p to m	.94 (6.4)	response of q to pu	-.07 (1.6)
		response of q to kl	.96 (23.4)
		response of q to dev	-.08 (3.7)

The relevant likelihood ratio tests used to determine 'causality' are given in Table 4.

**TABLE 4**  
**TESTS OF ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS OF MODEL 4**

---

<u>Alternative hypotheses</u>	<u>Value of likelihood ratio</u>	<u><math>\chi^2</math> Critical value (.05)</u>	<u>Result</u>
q $\rightarrow$ p; pe $\nrightarrow$ q	34.1	6.0	Reject
q $\rightarrow$ p; pu $\nrightarrow$ q	2.1	3.8	Cannot reject
q $\nrightarrow$ p; pe, pu $\rightarrow$ q	9.6	11.1	Cannot reject

---

Once again feedback is seen to exist and once again the response of p to q is ill determined, being neither significantly

different from zero nor from negative one. Again the cross-correlogram revealed no significant correlations among the residuals, and Haugh's S-statistic is 11.8 (with 17 degrees of freedom).

As one can see, the results of this model are broadly similar to those of Model 3 in terms of 'fit' and reasonableness. The partial response of inflation to an acceleration in the money supply is not significantly different from unity. This result is virtually identical to the findings of von Furstenberg and White (1980), except that we interpret it as an implication that monetary growth is non-neutral because of the negative effect of inflation on productivity growth. The partial response of inflation to productivity growth is near negative one in size, but, because it is not well determined, the hypothesis that it is zero cannot be rejected. The long-run response of inflation to a one percentage point increase in productivity growth is -1.11 percentage points if changes in inflation are perfectly foreseen and -.91 percentage points if they are not.

The partial response of productivity growth to a one percentage point increase in anticipated (unanticipated) inflation is a decline of .26 (.07) percentage points. In the long run, a perfectly foreseen (unforeseen) increase in inflation of one percentage point induces a reduction in productivity growth of .34 (.08) percentage points.

It has been suggested that the observed relationship between

productivity growth and inflation is spurious because the effects of the energy sector are neglected. The argument proceeds as follows. First, it is put forth that energy price inflation is a significant cause of general price inflation. Further, it is also argued that the change in the relative price of energy results in a change in the proportions in which energy, capital and labour are combined in the production process and that these variations in factor proportions influence the growth of labour productivity.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, according to this hypothesis, rising energy costs cause both general price inflation and diminished labour productivity. Thus, since energy is excluded from explicit consideration in the preceding empirical analysis, the observed correlation between inflation and productivity growth is spurious: it does not imply a causal relationship.<sup>20</sup>

If this hypothesis were correct, then one would expect that including energy price inflation ( $e$ ) as a determinant of general price inflation and including the growth of the energy to labour ratio ( $e_l$ ) in the productivity equation, would lead to significant coefficients on both of these variables and would result in the coefficients on inflation in the productivity equation becoming insignificant. The energy price and value data were constructed from Statistics Canada Input-Output Tables (Statistics Canada Catalogue nos. 15-201E and 15-202E); see Masson, Muller and Simard (1980) for complete details. Constraints on data availability

reduced the sample period to 1963 Q2 to 1978 Q4. The results are as follows:

$$p = - .74 - .14q - .32q(-1) + .10q(-2) + .06q(-3) - .01q(-4)$$

(2.2)      (1.4)      (3.3)      (1.0)      (0.6)      (0.1)

$$+ .51w - .06w(-1) + .31w(-2) - .24w(-3) + .09w(-4)$$

(3.8)      (0.4)      (2.2)      (1.8)      (0.8)

$$+ .45dev - .74dev(-1) + .64dev(-2) - .39dev(-3) + .93pus$$

(3.7)      (4.2)      (3.8)      (3.8)      (5.8)

$$+ .01e + .02e(-1) + .01e(-2) - .04e(-3) - .03e(-4)$$

(0.3)      (0.5)      (0.3)      (1.0)      (0.9)

Quasi-R<sup>2</sup> = .81

$$q = .34 + .02p + .03p(-1) - .12p(-2) - .15p(-3) - .04p(-4)$$

(4.8)      (0.5)      (0.6)      (2.8)      (3.4)      (1.1)

$$+ .01p(-5) - .04p(-6) + .94k1 + .80dev - .90dev(-1)$$

(0.4)      (1.0)      (23.5)      (17.1)      (18.1)

$$+ .00e1 + .00e1(-1) - .01e1(-2) + .02e1(-3) + .01e1(-4)$$

(0.3)      (0.0)      (0.3)      (0.8)      (0.8)

Quasi-R<sup>2</sup> = .93

(MODEL 5)

The sums of the current and lag coefficients are:

response of p to q	-.32 (1.1)	response of q to p	-.29 (9.0)
response of p to w	.62 (4.1)	response of q to k1	.94 (23.5)
response of p to dev	-.03 (0.5)	response of q to dev	-.10 (3.7)
response of p to pus	.93 (5.8)	response of q to e1	.03 (0.4)
response of p to pe	-.03 (0.7)		

A likelihood ratio test of the significance of the coefficients of e and e1 yields a value of 5.9, compared to a 5 percent critical value of 18.3. This is a clear rejection of the hypothesis that the observed relationship between inflation and productivity growth results solely because each are in turn related to energy price inflation.

Finally, three additional caveats to the interpretation of our results are worth noting. First, it is possible that our results are due to the existence of what has recently been labelled the underground or 'subterranean' economy.<sup>21</sup> If the prevalence of these extra-legal activities is an increasing function of the realized rate of inflation, then an increase in that rate would appear to 'cause' a reduction in output and perhaps in labour productivity from levels that would have otherwise prevailed. However, it is virtually impossible to test this hypothesis formally owing to a lack of adequate data on the magnitude of this 'subterranean' economy.



Second, Terborgh (1979) has pointed out a divergence between U.S. labour productivity data for manufacturing as derived from deflated current dollar statistics from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and those derived from the Federal Reserve Board's index of industrial production which involve more actual counting of physical output. This divergence is apparently an increasing function of realized inflation (or of shifts in relative prices), and it is therefore possible that implicit price deflators are systematically overestimating the 'true' price level in inflationary times and that this bias increases with inflation.<sup>22</sup> If the same holds true for Canada, our findings may simply be the product of the way in which the data are constructed. Once again there is no apparent way to evaluate the validity of this hypothesis.

Third, we used average hours worked per employee in the construction, mining and manufacturing sectors as representative of the economy-wide average. There was a shift of labour into the service sector, particularly in the 1960s, and since this sector traditionally has lower average hours worked, we have underestimated productivity in the 1960s and hence underestimated the decline in productivity. This would imply that our estimate of the response of productivity growth to inflation may well be biased towards zero.

## 6 FINAL REMARKS

In this paper we have attempted to identify the macro-economic relationship between productivity growth and inflation using both reduced-form and structural models. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that the result of increased productivity growth is a one-for-one reduction in inflation, against the alternative hypothesis that because of a feedback relationship between the two, the response might be more than one-for-one.

Using a bivariate reduced-form approach we were able to reject the unit elasticity hypothesis. Because of significant feedback, the implied multiplier associated with a one percentage point increase in productivity growth is a 2.24 percentage point decline in inflation. However, significant cross-correlation of the residuals indicated the presence of specification error.

We then turned to a variety of structural models and again found a feedback relationship. Moreover, while we found anticipated inflation to figure more importantly than unanticipated inflation in the explanation of the fluctuations in productivity growth, we found uncertainty about inflation to have no role in explaining productivity growth. The long-run response of productivity growth to a 'permanent' one percentage point increase in inflation varied from a decline of .08 percentage points when expectations were assumed not to adapt, to a decline of .34 percentage points when expectations were assumed to adapt fully. We estimated that an exogenously induced one percentage point

decline in inflation would eventually multiply into a decline in inflation of between 1.23 and 1.33 percentage points because of its feedback onto productivity growth. The long-run inflation multiplier associated with an increase in productivity growth was calculated to range between  $-.75$  and  $-1.33$ , depending on the particular specification of the model. It is worth pointing out that while these estimates clearly indicate that the recent decline in productivity growth has contributed to rising inflation, they also suggest that the effects have not been large enough to conclude that this interaction is the sole cause of the current high levels of inflation. However, the increased inflation rates of the 1970s are sufficient to explain virtually the entire recent slowdown in productivity growth.



FOOTNOTES

1. A brief description of the Freund and Manchester model is as follows:

Let  $p$  = the rate of price inflation (as measured by the CPI),

$w$  = the rate of wage inflation,

$q$  = the rate of labour productivity growth, and

$u$  = the rate of unemployment.

Then  $p = w - q$  if we assume that prices are set according to unit labour cost, and

$$w_t = ap_{t-1} + bq_{t-1} + cu_t + d \quad (*)$$

Substituting out for  $w$  and lagged  $p$ , we have

$$p_t = -q_t + (b-a) \sum_{j=1}^n a^{j-1} q_{t-1} + cu_t + d$$

Now if productivity growth is shocked for  $n + 1$  periods by an amount  $X$ , then

$$\Delta p_{tn} = \left[ -1 + (b-a) \sum_{j=1}^n a^{j-1} \right] X_n$$

and, as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , and assuming  $a < 1$

$$\Delta p_t/X = -1 + (b-a)/(1-a)$$

Freund and Manchester estimated equation (\*) in order to derive estimates of  $a$  and  $b$ . For the U.S. private business sector the results were:

$$w(t) = 6.30 + 0.81 p_{t-1} + 0.17 q_{t-1} - 0.62 u_t$$

(5.15) (6.84) (0.88) (2.97)

$$R^2 = 0.74 \quad D.W. = 2.23 \quad 1953 \text{ to } 1979$$

Thus, the equilibrium long-run elasticity of inflation with respect to productivity growth is:

$$-1 + ((.17 - .81)/(1 - .81)) = 4.4$$

When we duplicated this equation for Canada our results were extremely sensitive to the choice of price index used to measure inflation and significant autocorrelation was in evidence. In addition, an intercept shift for the period 1976 Q1 to 1978 Q4 (the period of controls administered by the Anti-Inflation Board) was required. When first-order serial correlation was allowed for, the coefficient on the unemployment rate became insignificant and the term was

dropped. With these modifications, the implied multiplier is 1.57 using the Consumer Price Index, 1.18 with the GNE deflator and .98 using the ratio of GDP to RDP i.e., the GDP deflator. Estimated multipliers were significantly larger when no autocorrelation correction was applied.

2. Vining and Elwertowski (1976), Touche Ross and Company (1976), Liebling (1980), Malkiel (1979), and Mullineaux (1980) among others, have put forward similar arguments. Moreover, Okun (1971) and Gordon (1971) showed that for seventeen industrialized nations the correlation between average inflation rates and the standard deviation of these rates was .78 for the 1951 to 1968 period, .90 from 1951 to 1960, and .40 (not significant) from 1960 to 1968. Gordon and Halpern (1976) found the correlation to be .91 for thirty-three nations over the 1952-72 period. Logue and Willett (1976) extended the sample to forty-one countries -- including both developed and developing nations. They also extended the sample period to include the years 1948 to 1970. They found that the positive relationship seems to have declined in the latter half of the period relative to the earlier years, but that it remains significant for the over-all sample. Upon disaggregating the sample into such broad categories as highly industrialized countries, Latin America etc., they found the correlation to be robust for all groups except the highly industrialized nations. They then



disaggregated by average rate of inflation and found that the correlation was apparent only when inflation exceeded a rate of about 4 percent per annum. Jaffee and Kleiman (1977) undertook a similar analysis for seventeen OECD nations and sixteen Latin American countries over the 1951-71 period, and found the relationship to be robust, except for the latter group, over the 1961-71 period. Foster (1978), using a different variability measure, showed a significant relationship that was robust to variations in time period and country choice. Vining and Elwertowski (1976) presented evidence that the distribution of individual price changes is skewed, and that this skewness is especially pronounced in periods of high inflation.

3. Cukierman and Wachtel (1979) have recently disputed Vining and Elwertowski's interpretation by claiming that both the increased variation of the general price level and the increased dispersion of relative prices are caused by the increased variance of aggregate and relative excess demand shocks.
4. Able (1980), in his recently completed dissertation, demonstrated that an investment equation that incorporates the assumptions that all variances and covariances associated with input and output prices are proportional to output prices, and in which uncertainty is treated as a cost of

production, significantly outperforms a traditional Jorgensonian investment function in predicting the sluggish investment spending of the 1975-78 period.

5. Pointing to the inflation-wrought increase in real U.S. effective corporate tax rates and the consequent reduction in investment, Gordon (1980, p. 109) has recently written: "Through this and other channels, inflation may be partly responsible for the decline in the growth of productivity ... during the latter part of the 1970s, although recent studies indicate that the slowdown in investment explains only part of the productivity story." Those who have studied the time, regional and industrial patterns of productivity growth almost universally recognize the significant role played by investment spending and capital intensity in determining that growth. For Canada see Postner (1971), Davenport (1979), Auer (1979), Rao (1979) and Bilkes (1980). For the United States see, for example, McCarthy (1978), Bennett (1979), Siegel (1979), Clark (1978), Nadiri (1980), Kendrick (1976), Norsworthy et al (1979), Denison (1979), and Klotz et al (1980). However, Thurow (1979) argues that increased investment will cause an increase in the size of the construction sector (which traditionally exhibits low productivity growth) thereby lowering aggregate productivity growth, while Zohar (cited in Friedland, 1980) claims investment spending is effective in increasing productivity

in only four of Canada's nineteen two-digit manufacturing industries.

6. For Canada see Pesando (1980), Bélanger and McIlveen (1980) and Touche Ross and Company (1976). For the United States see Tideman and Tucker (1976), Terborgh (1974), Kopcke (1978, 1980), Haberler (1979), Corcoran (1977, 1979), Okun (1975), Holland and Myers (1979, 1980), Tatom and Turley (1978), Tatom (1979), Flemming (1976), Richardson (1979), Nowotny (1980), Hart (1980), and a series of papers by Feldstein and his collaborators, most recently, Feldstein (1980).
7. See Jones (1980), Jaffe and Mandelker (1976), Bodie (1976) and Nelson (1976a).
8. Ruttan (1979) has hypothesized a "dialectical interaction between inflation and productivity" (p. 896). Kendrick (1980) has recently written: "The relationship between inflation and productivity is, of course, an inverse one. While inflation impairs productivity growth, so does a retardation of the latter variable accelerate inflation through stronger cost push." (p. 18). Okun (1980) has recently stated: "There are ample grounds for the suspicion ... that various aspects of our chronic inflation may account for some of the puzzle of the productivity slowdown." (p. 168). Denison (1979) has also argued that inflation has

impaired the efficiency of markets by causing information to become outdated more quickly and by increasing the variance of individual price changes. Similar thoughts have recently been expressed by the Council of Economic Advisers, (1981, pp. 33-34) and Wallich (1981). Evans (1980) alluded to the possibility of a vicious circle emanating from negative rates of return on saving through inadequate investment to lower productivity and higher inflation, or to dollar depreciation and back to higher prices and lower investment. Nordhaus (1980) has expressed doubts that the negative effects of inflation are large; however, he uses purely static allocative arguments, whereas productivity growth is in large part a question of dynamics.

9. On a more practical level, it is also known that under certain circumstances Granger-Sims techniques may give misleading results. For example, Gelb and Selody (1978) and Jacobs, Leamer and Ward (1979) have shown that when data are measured with error, Granger-Sims techniques can indicate the presence of Granger-causality when, in fact, it is absent. Alternatively, Sims (1977) has shown that if Y is perfectly controlled by X, a Granger-Sims technique may lead to the conclusion that X and Y are independent when in fact they are causally related in a very significant way. Jacobs, Leamer and Ward also argued that since Granger-Sims techniques operate on reduced forms, the parameters of which are complex

expressions of structural parameters, they are not useful in testing the more powerful hypothesis that a structural parameter or group of structural parameters are near zero. A reduced-form parameter near zero need not imply insignificant structural parameters. According to Jacobs, Leamer and Ward this is a particularly serious drawback of the technique since errors in model specification which bias zero coefficients away from zero are common in economics. Finally, one-way Granger-causality is only a necessary condition and not sufficient in itself for exogeneity in the usual econometric sense. In particular, because it operates on reduced forms, the technique is not useful in isolating contemporaneous exogeneity. On the other hand, Sims (1977) has argued that although there are certain conditions under which the Granger-Sims technique can be inaccurate, these conditions are not likely to be found in typical economic data.

10. The consequences of using an alternative measure of productivity are presented in Appendix A. Generally, the magnitude of the effect of a change in productivity growth on inflation appears to be sensitive to the choice of productivity measure, whereas the effect of a variation in inflation on productivity growth proves to be very robust.
11. Real Domestic Product, Gross Domestic Product and employment

series were seasonally adjusted at source, whereas the data on man-hours were seasonally adjusted at the Bank of Canada using the X-11 seasonal adjustment package.

12. Akaike's criterion is

$$FPE = \sum_{i=1}^T ((Y_i - y_i)^2 / T) \cdot (T+K+1) / (T-K-1)$$

where  $Y_i$  represents the fitted values and  $y_i$  represents the actual values in an OLS regression with  $T$  observations and  $K+1$  coefficients. Geweke and Meese (1979) discuss alternative methods of determining lag length.

13. These results were confirmed by a modified Pierce-Haugh (1977) test in which the residuals from the univariate autoregressive specifications are cross-correlated. The pattern of cross-correlations indicated a two-way relationship. The Haugh S-statistic had a value of 58.8 which exceeds the critical  $\chi^2$  with 41 degrees of freedom (55.8). Thus we reject independence.

14. We experimented with various measures of excess demand, including deviations of RDP around an exponential trend,

around an exponential trend through peaks, and around an exponential trend that shifts in 1973 Q2. The results reported in the text use the latter measure of dev (results using other measures are reported in Appendix B). The rationale for allowing the trend in RDP to differ after 1973 is that the rise in oil prices after 1973 rendered a portion of the capital stock obsolete (see footnote 19). The direct response of productivity growth to expected inflation varies between  $-.10$  and  $-.24$ , that of productivity growth to unexpected inflation varies between  $.04$  and  $-.12$ , and that of price inflation to wage inflation varies between  $.64$  and  $.88$ . The only large variation occurs in the case of the direct response of inflation to productivity growth, which varies between  $-1.99$  and  $-.61$ .

15. It may be thought that these figures underestimate the response of productivity growth to inflation since, after all, one of the mechanisms through which inflation affects productivity is via capital accumulation, and the rate of change of the capital-labour ratio enters as a separate explanatory variable in the productivity growth equation. However, a simple (OLS estimation and arbitrarily fixed lag lengths) bivariate Granger-causality test of inflation ( $p$ ) and the rate of capital deepening ( $k_1$ ) indicated that these two variables are intertemporally independent.

16. It should be pointed out that a one-step-ahead forecast is a very narrow concept of anticipations. There are many arguments that suggest that the term 'anticipations of inflation' refers to expectations over a time horizon longer than one period ahead or to expectations more subjective than a mechanical rule.
17. See Appendix C for a description of three intermediate simulations.
18. The two versions of the inflation equation are not necessarily inconsistent. The first version assumes wages and other 'real' factors are the exogenous driving force behind inflation and that monetary growth accommodates. The second version assumes monetary growth is the main exogenous source of inflation and that price inflation drives wage inflation.
19. For U.S. evidence regarding the importance of energy in the determination of productivity growth see, for example, Norsworthy et al (1979), Siegel (1979), a series of papers by Robert Rasche and John Tatom, e.g., Tatom (1979), and a series of papers by Jorgenson et al, e.g., Hudson and Jorgenson (1978) and Jorgenson. For Canada see Bilkes (1980). For contrary evidence see Berndt (1980).



20. Gregory (1980, p. 91) suggests that possibly the only way to reverse Berndt's conclusion that energy price inflation has had a negligible impact on productivity growth would be to model the direct effect of energy price inflation on aggregate inflation and the subsequent effect of aggregate inflation on productivity growth. This approach is similar to that used in our Model 5.
21. For the United States, see Porter (1979) and the references cited therein; for Canada see Wong and Rose (1980).
22. This hypothesis was, however, explicitly rejected for the U.S. construction industry in Stokes (1979).

APPENDIX A

**An alternative measure of productivity**

Alternative versions of the inflation-productivity growth relationship were estimated using productivity measured as the output per man-hour in the private business sector (excluding agriculture and non-commercial business). This narrower definition allows us to avoid those sectors where productivity measures are suspect (particularly the government sector). In the presentation of the following results, the reported coefficient is the sum of the individual coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged values of the variables. The order of the lag polynomial is given in parentheses following each variable, while the t-ratio for the sum of the coefficients is in parentheses below. In all cases at least one individual coefficient of the lag polynomial is significant, and hence an insignificant t-ratio for a sum is generally indicative of an oscillating pattern of lag coefficients.

**Alternative A1:**

$$p = - .47 + .43w(4) + .04dev(4) - .52q(4) + 1.08pus$$

(1.4)      (3.1)      (0.9)      (2.2)      (6.4)

Quasi-R<sup>2</sup>=.72

$$q = .32 - .25p(4) + .91k1(3) - .08dev(2)$$

(1.5)      (2.6)      (3.8)      (1.7)

Quasi-R<sup>2</sup>=.69

**Alternative A2:**

$$p = - .33 + 1.10m(8) - .65q(4)$$

(1.1)            (8.0)            (2.9)

$$\text{Quasi-R}^2 = .57$$

$$q = .38 - .18pe(1) + .09pu(0) + .68kl(0) - .10dev(1)$$

(2.4)            (1.8)            (0.8)            (6.3)            (2.4)

$$\text{Quasi-R}^2 = .68$$

In the above alternatives, deviations are measured by fluctuations of output around its trend. As is discussed in the text, this trend line is allowed to change in 1973 Q2. As a test of the robustness of our results to this measure, a version of the relationship was estimated using an alternative measure of dev. Here, dev was measured as deviations in output around trend output based on a Cobb-Douglas production function with the actual capital stock, the average employment rate and trended average weekly hours as factor inputs.

**Alternative A3:**

$$p = .22 + .38w(4) + .14dev(4) - 1.19q(4) + .99pus$$

(0.5)            (2.1)            (1.9)            (3.3)            (5.0)

$$\text{Quasi-R}^2 = .48$$

$$q = .07 - .19p(4) + 1.03kl(3) - .09dev(2)$$

(0.3)            (1.8)            (3.8)            (1.6)

$$\text{Quasi-R}^2 = .61$$

APPENDIX B

Alternative measures of fluctuations in output

Alternative versions of the inflation-productivity growth relationship were estimated using various measures of fluctuations in output. The first alternative measures dev as fluctuations in RDP about its sample trend. In the second approach, dev is measured as fluctuations in RDP about an exponential trend through sample peaks. The quarters of peak output used were 1969 Q1 and 1974 Q1. The third alternative measures dev as fluctuations in RDP about an exponential trend through peaks that break in 1974 Q1. Here, the high output quarters were taken to be 1962 Q2, 1969 Q1 and 1974 Q1. The first version of the inflation-productivity growth relationship was:

$$p = a_0 + \sum_{i=0}^6 a_1(i) w + \sum_{i=0}^4 a_2(i) dev + \sum_{i=0}^4 a_3(i) q$$

$$q = b_0 + \sum_{i=0}^2 b_1(i) pe + \sum_{i=0}^1 b_2(i) pu + \sum_{i=0}^5 b_3(i) kl + \sum_{i=0}^4 b_4(i) dev$$

(B.1)

and produced the following results:

Table B1

p equation:	Sum of coefficients (t-ratios) for alternative:		
	1	2	3
<u>variable</u>			
constant	1.31 (3.0)	-.44 (0.8)	1.14 (3.0)
w	.64 (2.2)	.88 (4.5)	.64 (4.0)
dev	.05 (0.2)	-.14 (0.7)	.16 (1.0)
q	-1.99 (4.8)	-.61 (1.2)	-1.28 (4.5)
Quasi-R <sup>2</sup>	.51	.63	.61
q equation:			
<u>variable</u>			
constant	.22 (2.3)	-.06 (0.5)	.04 (0.4)
pe	-.12 (3.1)	-.10 (3.8)	-.24 (7.6)
pu	-.12 (1.4)	.04 (0.6)	.01 (0.1)
kl	.86 (9.2)	1.08 (10.2)	.96 (13.2)
dev	-.02 (1.2)	-.04 (2.9)	-.08 (3.7)
Quasi-R <sup>2</sup>	.92	.96	.96

The second version of the relationship is:

$$p = a_0 + \sum_{i=0}^8 a_1(i) m + \sum_{i=0}^4 a_2(i) q$$

$$q = b_0 + \sum_{i=0}^1 b_1(i) pe + b_2 pu + b_3 kl + \sum_{i=0}^1 b_4(i) dev$$

(B.2)

This version produced the following results:

**Table B2**

p equation:		Sum of coefficients (t-ratios) for alternative:					
		1		2		3	
<u>variable</u>							
constant	.01 (0.1)	.10 (0.3)	.31 (0.9)				
m	.96 (6.5)	.93 (6.3)	.87 (6.0)				
q	-.75 (2.5)	-.81 (2.7)	-.98 (3.4)				
Quasi-R <sup>2</sup>	.53	.53	.52				
q equation:							
<u>variable</u>							
constant	.06 (1.1)	.05 (0.9)	-.02 (0.3)				
pe	-.07 (2.2)	-.10 (3.5)	-.21 (6.6)				
pu	-.03 (1.0)	-.07 (2.0)	-.08 (2.1)				
kl	.96 (27.2)	.98 (28.8)	.97 (27.0)				
dev	-.03 (2.7)	-.03 (3.7)	-.09 (5.4)				
Quasi-R <sup>2</sup>	.94	.95	.93				

## APPENDIX C

### Alternative simulation rules about inflation expectations

There are an infinite number of intermediate assumptions about inflation expectations that lie between the extremes of perfect foresight and continual ignorance. Moreover, as all simulations are necessarily hypothetical, it is impossible to know what the true adjustment path would have been. In this Appendix we highlight three intermediate models of inflation expectations.

First, we assumed that our constructed anticipations series was an accurate reflection of 'true' anticipations. This assumption was useful because it allowed us to sidestep the problem of a lack of a measure of expected inflation. We then modelled this 'true' anticipations series with a distributed lag on past inflation and productivity growth. The rationale for fitting a function with time-invariant parameters to a series that is constructed with explicit time-varying parameters is that this simpler model is an adequate 'as if' representation of the more complex 'true' behavioural model. We experimented with various lag lengths, imposed the constraint that the sum of the coefficients on lagged realized inflation is unity, and finally settled on the following equation:

$$pe = .13 + .24 p(-1) + .42 p(-2) + .34 p(-3) - .25 q(-1)$$

(1.2)            (2.5)            (4.9)            (3.4)            (2.2)

$$R^2 = .71 \quad S.E.E. = .75 \quad D.W. = 1.73 \quad (C.1)$$

We added this equation to Model 3 and undertook our shocks. At first a shock to inflation was entirely unexpected and had only a minor effect on productivity growth. But agents gradually adapted their anticipations of inflation and, by the sixth quarter, inflation was inhibiting productivity growth. After three years the adjustment was virtually complete. At this point, realized inflation was 1.19 percentage points higher than before the shock, expected inflation was 1.27 percentage points higher and productivity growth was .31 percentage points lower. The reason for the divergence between anticipated and realized inflation is that the feedback effect of productivity growth on anticipated inflation is slightly larger than that for realized inflation. After a permanent increase in productivity growth, it was not until the twentieth quarter that anticipated inflation stabilized and equilibrium was re-established. Long-run elasticities for realized, anticipated and unanticipated inflation were -.79, -1.09, and .31, respectively. Productivity growth was eventually 1.25 percentage points higher than its control solution value.



In an alternative specification of inflation expectations, it was assumed that expectations take the same structural form as the realized inflation process:

$$\begin{aligned} pe = & -.23 + .38w - .03w(-1) + .24w(-2) - .35w(-3) \\ & +.14w(-4) - .17q - .26q(-1) - .01q(-2) - .06q(-3) \\ & -.12q(-4) + .37dev - .55dev(-1) + .64dev(-2) \\ & -.46dev(-3) + 1.03 \text{ pus} \end{aligned} \tag{C.2}$$

With this equation substituted into Model 3, we again shocked inflation and productivity growth. After a one percentage point increase in realized and anticipated inflation, equilibrium was re-established in three years. By this time realized inflation was 1.19 percentage points higher, anticipated inflation 1.31 percentage points higher, and productivity growth was .31 percentage points lower. A one percentage point increase in productivity growth was eventually multiplied into a 1.29 percentage point increase in productivity growth, with inflation dropping by .58 percentage points after one year, and eventually by .81 percentage points.

One final specification of inflation expectations was performed so that, once shocked, the system would be restored to

equilibrium with no change in unanticipated inflation. This was accomplished using:

$$p_e = .5p(-1) + (.5)^2 p(-2) + (.5)^3 p(-3) + (.5)^4 p(-4) + (.5)^4 p(-5) \quad (C.3)$$

A shock to realized inflation led to virtually complete adjustment in about 25 quarters. In the long run, inflation increased by about 1.18 percentage points and productivity growth declined by .29 percentage points. It took about one year after the start of the productivity growth shock for inflation to complete one-half of its adjustment. Inflation was eventually reduced by .74 percentage points.

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records and the role of the auditor in this process.

It is essential for the auditor to ensure that all transactions are properly recorded and that the books are balanced at all times.

The auditor should also be aware of the various methods used to manipulate the books and should be able to detect such frauds.

In conclusion, the auditor's primary duty is to provide an independent and objective opinion on the financial statements of the company.

REFERENCES

- Able, Stephen L. "Inflation Uncertainty, Investment Spending, and Fiscal Policy", Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, vol. 65, no. 2, February 1980, pp. 3-13.
- Akaike, H. "Fitting Autoregressive Models for Prediction", Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics 21, 1969, pp. 243-247.
- Amihud, Yakov. "Price-Level Uncertainty, Indexation and Employment", Southern Economic Journal, vol. 47, no. 3, January 1981, pp. 776-787.
- Auer, Ludwig. Regional Disparities of Productivity and Growth in Canada, Economic Council of Canada, Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Supply and Services Canada, Hull, 1979.
- Bélanger, Gérard and Neil McIlveen. Rates of Return and Investment Profitability, Long-Range and Structural Analysis Division, Department of Finance, April 1980.
- Bennett, Paul. "American Productivity Growth: Perspectives on the Slowdown", Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, vol. 4, no. 3, Autumn 1979, pp. 25-31.
- Berndt, Ernst R. "Energy Price Increases and the Productivity Slowdown in United States Manufacturing" in The Decline in Productivity Growth, Proceedings of a Conference held at Edgartown, Mass., Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, June 1980, pp. 60-89.
- Bilkes, Gerrit. "On Productivity and Potential Output", Bank of Canada mimeo, RM-80-27, Ottawa, 1980.
- Blejer, Mario I. and Leonardo Leiderman. "On the Real Effects of Inflation and Relative Price Variability: Some Empirical Evidence", Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 62, no. 4, New York, November 1980, pp. 539-544.
- Bodie, Zvi. "Common Stocks as a Hedge Against Inflation", Journal of Finance, vol. 31, no. 2, May 1976, pp. 459-470.
- Clark, Peter K. "Capital Formation and the Recent Productivity Slowdown", Journal of Finance, vol. 33, no. 3, June 1978, pp. 965-975.

- Corcoran, Patrick J. "Inflation, Taxes, and Corporate Investment Incentives", Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, vol. 2, Autumn 1977, pp. 1-10.
- Corcoran, Patrick J. "Inflation, Taxes, and the Composition of Business Investment", Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, vol. 4, no. 3, Autumn 1979, pp. 13-24.
- Council of Economic Advisers. Economic Report of the President, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1981.
- Cross, Stephen M. "A Note on Inflation, Taxation and Investment Returns", Journal of Finance, vol. 35, no. 1, March 1980, pp. 177-180.
- Cukierman, Alex and Paul Wachtel. "Differential Inflationary Expectations and the Variability of the Rate of Inflation: Theory and Evidence", American Economic Review, vol. 69, no. 4, September 1979, pp. 595-609.
- Davenport, Paul. "Capital and Productivity in Canada, 1947-1978", unpublished manuscript, McGill University, Montreal, August 1979.
- Denison, Edward F. "Explanations of Declining Productivity Growth", Survey of Current Business, vol. 59, no. 8, Part II, August 1979, U.S. Department of Commerce, pp. 1-24.
- Evans, Michael K. "Submission" to the Hearings for the 1979 Mid-year Review of the Economy, U.S. Joint Economic Committee, July 13, 1979, p. 418.
- Evans, Michael K. "Confessions of an Economic Forecaster", New York Times, February 17, 1980.
- Feldstein, Martin S. "Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment: Some Econometric Evidence", National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 577, Cambridge, Mass., November 1980.
- Flemming, J.S., L.D.D. Price and D.H.A. Ingram. "Trends in Company Profitability", Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 16, no. 1, March 1976, pp. 36-52.
- Foster, Edward. "The Variability of Inflation", Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 60, no. 3, August 1978, pp. 346-350.
- Freund, William C. and Paul B. Manchester. "Productivity and Inflation", paper presented to Conference on Productivity Research, American Productivity Center, Houston, April 22, 1980.

- Friedland, Seymour. "A New Look at Productivity", Financial Times of Canada, February 25, 1980, p. 12.
- Gelb, A. and J.G. Selody. "Causality Testing and Data Quality: Effects of Error-Induced Misspecification", Institute for Economic Research, Queen's University, Kingston, 1978.
- Geweke, J. and R. Meese. "Estimating Distributed Lags of Unknown Order", paper presented to the North American Econometric Society meetings, Montreal, 1979.
- Gordon, Myron J. and Paul J. Halpern. "Bond Share Yield Spreads Under Uncertain Inflation", American Economic Review, vol. 66, no. 4, September 1976, pp. 559-565.
- Gordon, Robert J. "Steady Anticipated Inflation: Mirage or Oasis", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1971, pp. 499-510.
- Gordon, Robert J. "Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas" in The American Economy in Transition, Martin Feldstein (ed.), University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, Chicago and London, 1980, pp. 101-162.
- Granger, C.W.J. "Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods", Econometrica, vol. 37, no. 3, May 1969, pp. 424-438.
- Gregory, Paul R. "Discussion of Berndt" in The Decline in Productivity Growth, Proceedings of a Conference held at Edgartown, Mass., Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, June 1980, pp. 90-92.
- Haberler, Gottfried. "The Present Economic Malaise" in Contemporary Economic Problems, 1979, William Fellner (ed.), American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, 1979.
- Hart, Peter J. "Accounting for Inflation in the United States", National Tax Journal vol. 33, no. 3, September 1980, pp. 247-255.
- Haugh, L.D. "Checking the Independence of Two Covariance-Stationary Time Series: A Univariate Residual Cross-Correlation Approach", Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 71, no. 354, June 1976, pp. 378-385.

- Hayes, Robert H. and William J. Abernathy. "Managing Our Way to Economic Decline", Harvard Business Review, vol. 58, no. 4, July-August 1980, pp. 67-77.
- Holland, Daniel M. and Stewart C. Myers. "Trends in Corporate Profitability and Capital Costs" in The Nation's Capital Needs: Three Studies, Robert Lindsay (ed.), Washington, 1979.
- Holland, Daniel M. and Stewart C. Myers. "Profitability and Capital Costs for Manufacturing Corporations and All Nonfinancial Corporations", American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, vol. 70, no. 2, May 1980, pp. 320-325.
- Hsiao, C. "Autoregressive Modeling of Canadian Money and Income Data", Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 74, no. 367, September 1979, pp. 553-560.
- Hudson, Edward A. and Dale W. Jorgenson. "Energy Prices and the U.S. Economy 1972-1976", Data Resources Review of the U.S. Economy, vol. 7, no. 9, September 1978, pp. 1.24-1.37.
- Jacobs, R.L., E.E. Leamer and M.P. Ward, "Difficulties with Testing for Causation", Economic Inquiry, vol. 17, no. 3, July 1979, pp. 401-413.
- Jaffee, Dwight M. and Ephraim Kleiman. "The Welfare Implications of Uneven Inflation" in Inflation Theory and Anti-Inflation Policy, Erik Lundberg (ed.), Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1977, pp. 285-307.
- Jaffe, Jeffrey F. and Gershon Mandelker. "The 'Fisher Effect' for Risky Assets: An Empirical Investigation", Journal of Finance, vol. 31, no. 2, May 1976, pp. 447-458.
- Jones, David S. "Expected Inflation and Equity Prices: A Structural Econometric Approach", National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 542, Cambridge, Mass., 1980.
- Jorgenson, Dale W. "Energy Prices and Productivity Growth", unpublished manuscript, n.d.
- Kendrick, John W. Postwar Productivity Trends in the United States, 1948-1969, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1973.
- Kendrick, John W. "Productivity Trends and Prospects" in U.S. Economic Growth from 1976 to 1986: Prospects, Problems and Patterns, Volume 1 - Productivity, U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1976, pp. 1-20.



- Kendrick, John W. "Survey of the Factors Contributing to the Decline in U.S. Productivity Growth" in The Decline in Productivity Growth, Proceedings of a Conference held at Edgartown, Mass., Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, June 1980, pp. 1-21.
- Kendrick, John W. and Elliot S. Grossman. Productivity in the United States: Trends and Cycles, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1980.
- Kennedy, Michael and Kevin Lynch. "The Modelling of Inflation Expectations", Bank of Canada mimeo, MFA File 160-4-1, Ottawa, 1979.
- Klein, Benjamin. "The Social Costs of the Recent Inflation: The Mirage of Steady 'Anticipated' Inflation", Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 3, a supplement to The Journal of Monetary Economics, 1976, pp. 185-212.
- Klein, Burton H. "The Slowdown in Productivity Advances: A Dynamic Explanation" in Technological Innovation for a Dynamic Economy, Christopher T. Hill and James M. Utterback (eds.), Pergamon Press, New York, 1980, pp. 66-117.
- Klotz, Benjamin et al. "A Study of High and Low 'Labor Productivity' Establishments in U.S. Manufacturing" in New Developments in Productivity Measurement and Analysis, John W. Kendrick and Beatrice N. Vaccara (eds.), National Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 44, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1980, pp. 239-292.
- Kopcke, Richard W. "The Decline in Corporate Profitability", New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, May/June 1978, pp. 36-60.
- Kopcke, Richard W. "Potential Growth, Productivity, and Capital Accumulation", New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, May/June 1980, pp. 22-41.
- Leijonhufvud, Axel. "Costs and Consequences of Inflation" in The Microfoundations of Macroeconomics, Macmillan, London, 1977, pp. 265-312.
- Levi, Maurice D. and John H. Makin. "Inflation Uncertainty and the Phillips Curve: Some Empirical Evidence", American Economic Review, vol. 70, no. 5, December 1980, pp. 1022-1027.



- Lewis, W. Arthur. "The Slowing Down of the Engine of Growth", American Economic Review, vol. 70, no. 4, September 1980, pp. 555-564.
- Liebling, Herman I. U.S. Corporate Profitability and Capital Formation: Are Rates of Return Sufficient, Pergamon Press, New York, 1980.
- Logue, Dennis E. and Thomas D. Willett. "A Note on the Relation Between the Rate and Variability of Inflation", Economica, vol. 43, no. 170, May 1976, pp. 151-158.
- Lydall, H.F. "Technical Progress in Australian Manufacturing", Economic Journal, vol. 78, no. 312, December 1968, pp. 807-826.
- Malkiel, Burton G. "The Capital Formation Problem in the United States", Journal of Finance, vol. 34, no. 2, May 1979, pp. 291-306.
- Mansfield, Edwin. "Basic Research and Productivity Increase in Manufacturing", American Economic Review, vol. 70, no. 5, December 1980, pp. 863-873.
- Masson, P., P. Muller and C. Simard. Sources des données utilisées pour "L'offre macroéconomique: La fonction de production", Banque du Canada, Département de Recherches, RM-80-32, juillet 1980.
- McCarthy, Michael D. "The U.S. Productivity Growth Recession: History and Prospects for the Future", Journal of Finance, vol. 33, no. 3, June 1978, pp. 977-988.
- Mullineaux, Donald J. "Unemployment, Industrial Production, and Inflation Uncertainty in the United States", Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 62, no. 2, May 1980, pp. 163-169.
- Nadiri, M. Ishaq. "Sectoral Productivity Slowdown", American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, vol. 70, no. 2, May 1980, pp. 349-352.
- Nelson, Charles R. "Inflation and Rates of Return on Common Stocks", Journal of Finance, vol. 31, no. 2, May 1976a, pp. 471-483.
- Nelson, Charles R. "Inflation and Capital Budgeting", Journal of Finance, vol. 31, no. 3, June 1976b, pp. 923-931.

- Nordhaus, William D. "Policy Responses to the Productivity Slowdown", Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 555, Yale University, June 1980, published in The Decline in Productivity Growth, Proceedings of a Conference held at Edgartown, Mass., Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, June 1980, pp. 147-172.
- Norsworthy, J.R., Michael J. Harper and Kent Kunze. "The Slowdown in Productivity Growth: Analysis of Some Contributing Factors", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 1979, pp. 387-421.
- Nowotny, Ewald. "Inflation and Taxation: Reviewing the Macroeconomic Issues", Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 18, no. 3, September 1980, pp. 1025-1049.
- Okun, Arthur M. "The Mirage of Steady Inflation", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 1971, pp. 485-498.
- Okun, Arthur M. "Inflation: Its Mechanics and Welfare Costs", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 1975, pp. 351-390.
- Okun, Arthur M. "Postwar Macroeconomic Performance" in The American Economy in Transition, Martin Feldstein (ed.), University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, Chicago and London, 1980, pp. 162-169.
- Parks, Richard W. "Inflation and Relative Price Variability", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 86, no. 1, February 1978, pp. 79-95.
- Pesando, James E. "Inflation and the Rates of Return on Bonds and Equities", Economic Council of Canada Discussion Paper 148, Ottawa, January 1980.
- Pierce, D.A. and L.D. Haugh. "Causality in Temporal Systems: Characterizations and a Survey", Journal of Econometrics, vol. 5, no. 3, May 1977, pp. 265-293.
- Porter, Richard T. "Some Notes on Estimating the Underground Economy", unpublished manuscript, U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, August 10, 1979.
- Postner, Harry H. An Analysis of Canadian Manufacturing Productivity: Some Preliminary Results, Economic Council of Canada, Staff Study No. 31, Information Canada, Ottawa, May 1971.

- Rao, P. Someshwar. "An Econometric Analysis of Labour Productivity in Canadian Industries: Some Further Results", Economic Council of Canada Discussion Paper No. 134, Ottawa, October 1979.
- Richardson, Gordon. "Companies, Inflation and Taxation", Annual Lecture of the Institute for Fiscal Studies, November 6, 1979.
- Ruttan, Vernon W. "Inflation and Productivity", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 61, no. 5, December 1979, pp. 896-902.
- Sandilands Committee. Report of the Inflation Accounting Committee, Command Document 6225, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1975.
- Siegel, Robin. "Why Has Productivity Slowed Down?" Data Resources Review of the U.S. Economy, vol. 8, no. 3, March 1979, pp. 1.59-1.65.
- Sims, C.A. "Money, Income, and Causality", American Economic Review, vol. 62, no. 4, September 1972, pp. 540-552.
- Sims, C.A. "Exogeneity and Causal Ordering in Macroeconomic Models" in New Methods in Business Cycle Research: Proceedings from a Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1977.
- Stokes, H. Kemble. "An Examination of the Productivity Decline in the Construction Industry", Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, March 1979.
- Tatom, John A. "The Productivity Problem", Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 61, no. 9, September 1979, pp. 3-16.
- Tatom, John A. and James E. Turley. "Inflation and Taxes: Disincentives for Capital Formation", Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 60, no. 1, January 1978, pp. 2-8.
- Terborgh, George. "Inflation and Profits", Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 30, no. 3, May/June 1974, pp. 19-23.
- Terborgh, George. "A Quizzical Look at Productivity Statistics", Capital Goods Review, no. 110, Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Washington, August 1979.

- Thurow, Lester. "The U.S. Productivity Problem", Data Resources Review of the U.S. Economy, vol. 7, no. 8, August 1979, pp. 1.14-1.19.
- Tideman, T. Nicolaus and Donald P. Tucker. "The Tax Treatment of Business Profits under Inflationary Conditions" in Inflation and the Income Tax, Chapter 2, Henry J. Aaron (ed.), Brookings, Washington, 1976.
- Touche Ross and Company. Inflation: Its Impact on Business, Toronto, May 7, 1976.
- U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee. Review of the Economy October 1978, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, October 10, 1978.
- Vining, Daniel R. Jr. and Thomas C. Elwertowski. "The Relationship Between Relative Prices and the General Price Level", American Economic Review, vol. 66, no. 4, September 1976, pp. 699-708.
- von Furstenberg, George M. and William H. White. "The Inflation Process in Industrial Countries Individually and Combined", Kyklos, vol. 33, no. 2, 1980, pp. 261-286.
- Wallich, Henry C. Statement Before the Temporary Subcommittee on Industrial Growth and Productivity, U.S. Senate (mimeo), Washington, January 27, 1981.
- Weil, Frank A. "Management's Drag on Productivity", Business Week, 2614, December 3, 1979, p. 14.
- Wong, Frieda and David Rose. "The Subterranean Economy: A Survey of the Literature and Applications to the Canadian Economy", Bank of Canada mimeo, RM-80-107, Ottawa, September 15, 1980.
- Wymer, C.R. "Computer Programs: RESIMUL Manual", mimeo, London School of Economics, London, 1968.
- Zell, Steven P. "Productivity in the U.S. Economy: Trends and Implications", Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, vol. 64, no. 9, November 1979, pp. 13-26.
- Zellner, A. "Causality and Econometrics" in Three Aspects of Policy and Policymaking: Knowledge, Data and Institutions, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 10, a supplement to the Journal of Monetary Economics, K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer (eds.), 1979, pp. 9-54.



