We study competition for consumer attention in which platforms can sacrifice service quality for attention. A platform can choose the “addictiveness” of its service. A mo[...]

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I study a model of competition between data intermediaries, which collect personal data from consumers and sell them to downstream firms. Competition has a limited impact[...]

I study a dynamic model of consumer privacy and platform data collection. In each period consumers choose their level of platform activity. Greater activity generates mor[...]

I study a dynamic model of consumer privacy and platform data collection. In each period, consumers choose their level of platform activity. Greater activity generates mo[...]

A firm buys data from consumers to learn about some uncertain state of the world. There are data externalities, whereby data of some consumers reveal information about ot[...]

I study how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on Sender's information. I consider a game in which, prior to Sender's information disclosure, Designer can restric[...]

I study the welfare and price implications of consumer privacy. A consumer discloses information to a multiproduct seller, which learns about his preferences, sets prices[...]