The author presents a model of a twin crisis, in which foreign and domestic residents play a banking game. Both "honest" and run equilibria of the post-deposit subgame ex[...]

Suppose that the dynamics of the macroeconomy were given by (partly) random fluctuations between two equilibria: "good" and "bad." One would interpret currency crises (or[...]

Suppose that the dynamics of the macroeconomy were given by (partly) random fluctuations between two equilibria: "good" and "bad." One would interpret currency crises (or[...]

In a search model of production, where agents accumulate heterogeneous amounts of human capital, an individual worker's wage depends on average human capital in the searc[...]

Many countries prohibit large shareholdings in their domestic banks. The authors examine whether such a restriction restrains competition in a duopolistic loan market. Bl[...]

The author describes a model with a corrupt banking system, in which bankers knowingly lend at market interest rates to back projects riskier than the market rate indicat[...]

The author develops a twin crisis model featuring multiple banks. At each bank, domestic and foreign depositors play a banking game. This game has a run and a no-run equi[...]